Nevertheless, the total of 19 battleships allowed under that measure was clearly insufficient to achieve this latter aim, or to satisfy the Kaiser for more than a few months. Although at the time the Reichstag was assured to the contrary, Tirpitz later admitted that »It was continually clear to me ... that the First Navy Law did not create the final fleet« 3 . The German government therefore devoted the period following to the exploitation in the newspapers of a whole series of overseas events, all of which appeared to point to the need of all powers for a large fleet. In this matter the press-conscious Foreign Minister, Bernhard voñ Bíilow, played a great part and his directives to the Press Bureau provide ample illustration of his utilisation of colonial quarrels for propaganda purposes. In November 1898, for example, he informed the government departments and the newspapers and publicists they influenced that the Kaiser wished the following points to be placed in the foreground:
How necessary the increase of the fleet has been. No successful overseas policy without a strong fleet. The role of the fleet in the Spanish-American war and during the Fashoda dispute. Why does Spain lie on the floor? Why does France retreat before England 4 ?
In the same way, the Samoan dispute with Britain and the United States in 1899 was persistently used to illustrate to the German people and Reidistag the neces-sity for a greater Navy®. It is also worth noting that one of Biilow's first actions upon learning of the apprehension by the British of the steamer Bundesrath was to inform the Press Bureau that:
His Majesty desires that the seizure of the Bundesrath should be utilised (without impolitic bitterness or heat against England but factually) with vigour and persistence for the Fleet measure. My latest speech for the fleet (no-one can know ' J 1 t consequences the war in South Africa would have, etc.) can also be Even before this fortuitous occurrence, the German public had become so excited over the Samoan affair and the prospect of a war in South Africa that Tirpitz had judged the time favourable for a further, and more dramatic, increase of the fleet. On September 28th, 1899, he laid before Wilhelm a scheme for the construction of a 45-battleship Navy, this total to be readied in two stages 7 . The first stage was to form the basis of the Second Navy Law. This plan so excited the Kaiser that he made a public plea for a larger fleet in his famous »Bitter need« speedi at Hamburg on October 18th, although the Admiral had not visualised approaching the Reichstag before the middle of 1900 and was quite taken aback by Wilhelm's announcement. Moreover, Tirpitz found it impossible to restrain his imperial Master's enthusiasm and was reluctantly forced to rush through his preparations for the new measure as quickly as he could. The Kaiser himself was so eager to exploit the existing favourable circumstances that he threatened to dissolve the Reichstag should it reject his demands 8 .
On December 11th, therefore, the introduction of a further fleet increase was formally announced in the Reichstag by Chancellor Hohenlohe. The main feature was to be drastic growth in the size of the battlefleet by the construction of a third battleship squadron of 8 vessels, and of a fourth such squadron when the coastal defence vessels reached the end of their days. Together with extra fleet flagships and reserve vessels, the German Navy would thus consist of 38 battleships instead of the 19 allowed by the First Navy Law. There was also to be an increase in the number of cruisers, although this was not so important. »The military situation against England demands battleships in as great a number as possible« 9 , Tirpitz had declared in June 1897 and this second Law revealed that his convictions on this point remained as firm as ever. Hohenlohe's announcement was followed by a speech from Biilow, in which he took great pains to point out to the Reichstag members the lessons of the events of the past two years, and to stress that much political and commercial jealousy of Germany existed in the world. Despite this, she was going forward and would not be stopped in her expansion. »In the coming century«, Biilow concluded, »the German people will either be the hammer or the anvil« 10 .
Immediately after Bülow's speech, Tirpitz rose to explain the technical reasons for the decision to bring in this new measure. But his speech was more significant for being the clearest public statement yet on the »risk theory«, the concept that Germany must equip herself with a fleet strong enough not only to defend her coasts but also able to threaten the overall maritime superiority of the most powerful Navy existing. In other words, Britain, in attacking sudi a fleet, might lose so many warships (despite winning the actual battle) that the Royal Navy would be inferior in numbers to the Franco-Russian naval forces. Cruiser warfare being useless against such a mighty opponent due to his possession, and Germany's lack, of overseas naval bases, »we must organise our Navy so that its greatest performance is in a defensive war in the North Sea, in a battle itself«. While pointing out that the Spanish-American war had shown how important it was for countries with large overseas interests to be able to protect them, he stressed that »Overseas conflicts with European nations with greater naval strength will be settled in Europe« 11 . No names were mentioned by Tirpitz in this speech but it was not difficult for his listeners to understand what nations he had in mind in his explanation of the risk theory.
The proposal to double the battlefleet only twenty months after the passing of the first Law was received with suspicion in many quarters, and the immediate reaction of the key Centre Party indicated that some convincing arguments would have to be put forward by the government to explain their haste. Nevertheless, after six months of painstaking reasoning and hard bargaining, the Second Navy Law was decisively passed by 201 votes to 103 on June 12th, 1900. Neither these negotiations nor the reasons why the government was so successful can be discussed at length here. Sufficient to note that the external situation (particularly the Boer War and the seizure of the steamers) remained most favourable, that both the parties and the government were willing to bargain over the proposed measure, that much private influence and pressure was exerted, and that Biilow threw all his energy into the task of converting the waverers with two powerful speeches during the secret debates of the Budget Commission. On Mardi 27th, the Foreign Minister declared that:
The purpose of the Navy Law is above all to secure peace for us against England.
As things now lie, a clash with England would be more dangerous and disadvantageous than any other eventuality, since England could damage us more than any other power on account of our present naval inferiority while on the other hand we would find it difficult to obtain allies for a conflict against England since we are so weak at sea.
In dramatic terms, Biilow then proceeded to paint a picture of what would befall
Germany in a war with Britain, which:
through the destruction of our great and ever-growing overseas interests, the seizure of our trade and the damaging of our export industry, would throw back our economic and political development for generations and nave an effect similar to the 30 Year's War.
Sudi a conflict could well come about from either the growing imperialist and chauvinistic feeling in Britain or as a result of the Anglo-German trade rivalry, which was steadily increasing. To the majority of English people, moreover, a quick naval attack on Germany would seem to be a relatively easy task, without dangerous consequences to them. The acute and critical confrontations which had occurred in the Samoan affair and at the seizure of the German steamers could not always be solved diplomatically, Germany could not often repeat the intense pressure she had used then, and Britain would not always be otherwise engaged. Another such confrontation, Biilow prophesied, could see Germany faced with the choice of a great humiliation or a calamitous war. This could only be avoided by the construction of a strong German battlefleet, which would deter any thought of war from »the one power which could attack us without special risk to itself« 12 .
On the following day, Biilow repeated these views. Things had altered since Bismarck's time, for not only had Germany developed world interests, but the Britain which had practised non-intervention in the Soudan, South Africa and elsewhere had radically changed and was now ruled by spirits who believed themselves called upon to maintain her economic supremacy of the world. Germany's fleet was defensively-minded, unlike some of her more extreme press opinions; but she must have adequate forces if future conflicts with Britain ever led to war. To these statements, the representative Röhrig retorted that he was still opposed to the increase of the battlefleet. The government had either miscalculated in the first naval bill, or conditions had greatly changed since then. Seizing upon this latter point, Biilow confidentially replied that:
in 1897, as the fleet measure was introduced, the possibility of a clash with England did not seriously appear to be at hand. But I dare not conceal that since then the circumstances have so changed that today such an eventuality is within the bounds of possibility 13 .
With arguments such as these, and with an ever-growing newspaper propaganda campaign, financed jointly by the government and heavy industry 14 , both the Reichstag and the public were converted into willing supporters of the greater fleet, and the voting figures were justly regarded by Wilhelm and the men of the »persönliches Regiment« as an outstanding parliamentary success. If the public debates stressed the general nature of Germany's need to increase the fleet and the government itself made only a few discreet references to Britain, the confidential documents reveal that the Second Navy Law was solely and systematically planned with that country in mind. Indeed, in every aspect of the Navy there was a swift change of focus in these few years from the previously prevailing concept of anticipating a war with the Dual Alliance to the stage where the possibility of a future conflict with Britain appeared to dominate all calculations. Lack of space permits only the brief mention at this point that in the contents of the fleet manoeuvres, in the »Winterarbeiten« topics of the staff officers, in the operations plans and especially in the overall strategic planning, the German Navy was becoming somewhat obsessed with the idea of preparing for a war with Britain. This is not to say that sudi an event was looked forward to in Berlinin fact, Tirpitz appears to have been terrified of it happening before the fleet was built up -but only that, as Biilow had declared, the prospect was no longer regarded as impossible. Or, as a very important naval memorandum of this time put it:
The danger in this situation was, therefore, that England could succumb to the temptation of exploiting Germany's defencelessness at sea and Russia and France's neutrality, to stunt Germany's ability to carry out Weltpolitik for generations. The task of diplomacy is, so far as honour allows, to avoid every armed conflict with England so long as Germany is weak at sea and is not alliance-worthy to Russia. The task of the military organs is, however, to clearly keep in mind a warlike conflict with England and to consider its possibility 18 .
If these fleet calculations are any guide, Germany had considered Britain to be a probable rival and foe long before London's attention was turned to the threat which Wilhelm's battlefleet was beginning to present to her maritime ascendancy.
Thus the fleet created by the Second Navy Law was conceived in an atmosphere of public anglophobia and planned with the chief, if not the sole, aim of altering the power relationship between Britain and Germany. As an internal political manoeuvre this measure was certainly a success; as a shrewd tactical move to gain the Reidistag's approval it was faultless; as a method of strengthening the Monarchy and the government's popularity it was also well calculated; but as a strategic and foreign policy measure it contained some crucial faults.
It is not the task of this paper to examine its effect upon the internal and foreign policies of the Reich, but to scrutinise once again, in the light of the latest archival research, the full strategic and military aspects of Tirpitz's calculations, i. e. to stand bade and pose the questions: What was the German fleet to do? What would be its various functions if a war with Great Britain did break out as a result of trade rivalries or colonial quarrels? Granted the completion of the construction programme contemplated under the Second Navy Law, do the arguments of Tirpitz and the fleet propagandists regarding the tasks of the German Navy survive serious scrutiny from the military standpoint? Finally, and this is the most important question of all, was the fleet of Tirpitz's only silly because it was seen to have failed later, or did glaring faults, both strategic and political, which should have noticed, already exist in 1900?
The first and most important task of the German fleet, at least if the vast mass of material and statistics published by the Reichsmarineamt about the expansion of Germany's overseas interests is to be taken at all seriously, was the protection of her merchant shipping, her colonies and her foreign investments 18 . Immediately, of course, the paradox of looking after interests in Asia or defending colonies in Africa with a battlefleet whose radius of action did not extend past Cherbourg, springs to the fore. The ships which undertake sudi protective functions are not battleships, but cruisers and gunboats, precisely the type of vessels which Tirpitz, in his negotiations with the Budget Commission in March 1900, had abandoned in order to ensure the Reichstag's approval for the doubling of the battlefleet. How exactly were these battleships, even in peacetime, to protect German merchant vessels in mid-Atlantic, to crush native troubles in the colonies, to represent Germany's claim to be consulted in the scramble for tropical territories, and to 1β Β Α-M A 5656, Flottenerweiterungsprogramm -Ganz Geheim, Vol. 1, Adm, GrapoVs draft of 19. persuade weak régimes to have a due regard for German interests in their country? And how were the colonies and trade routes to be protected from the British in wartime? Surely a strong overseas cruiser fleet was what was required?
Tirpitz's answer was simple and disarming: the existing or a slightly increased cruiser fleet could probably deal with the native troubles and the recalcitrant régimes, but it was impossible to match Britain on the spot in the scramble for fresh territory or to protect Germany's overseas trade routes and colonies in wartime against the Royal Navy. First of all, Germany lacked the necessary overseas fleet bases to be strong enough to defend her interests in foreign waters, while Britain in contrast had an abundance of them; and secondly, the British cruiser strength was so overwhelming that it would be virtually impossible to match this numerically 17 .
Tirpitz looked for the solution to this strategic problem, not overseas, but in Europe itself: to be precise, in the region between Heligoland and the Thames. The German battlefleet in the North Sea, he reasoned, would have an influence over the entire globe without having to have substantial forces at a particular troublespot. Their presence near England alone would be enough to make the British conciliatory and amenable. This strategy remained the same in a war against the Royal Navy also: the decisive battle was to be in the North Sea. Expressed bluntly, Tirpitz saw his battlefleet in the form of a sharp knife, held gleaming and ready only a few inches away from the jugular vein of Germany's most likely enemy. The mere sight of it, he calculated, would persuade Britain in peacetime not to trample upon Germany's rights overseas and to have a due regard for German interests (which could be widely interpreted). In the event of an outbreak of war, of course, this weapon would be ready to strike at the first opportunity. Seriously or even deadly wounded by this action, Britain would have little diance to, or perhaps interest in, seizing Germany's overseas trade and possessions. This is obviously a major diarge and requires some justification before one can dismiss the older views that the German fleet construction was essentially a defensive measure and that sudi increases were in keeping with the spirit of the times. Both viewpoints are, in fact, correct but only to a certain degree. Tirpitz's policy was double-sided and the general excuse of Zeitgeist cannot be used to cover up the particularly anti-British and aggressive aspects of his thinking. The distinguishing feature of the German naval policy was the belief of the statesmen in Berlin that there existed a fixed connection between Weltpolitik and their seapower relationship to Great Britain. For the former to be safely and fully realised, the latter had to be substantially altered.
Both Tirpitz and Biilow, the main architects of the Navy Laws, were deeply conscious of the ever-upward trend of Germany's population, industry, shipping and trade, and of the seemingly irresistable expansion of German power and influence into the outside world which accompanied this growth; of the delicacy of the internal political balance and the need to prevent a further growth of Social Democracy; and of the necessity of protecting the Kaiser's position (and satis-fying his person) by achieving some diplomatic and colonial successes 19 . What stood in the way, or to them seemed to stand in the way, of all these aims was Britain and her Navy. The fear that the commercial challenge of Germany in all parts of the globe could eventually lead to a surprise and crippling attack by the Royal Navy was not just a peculiar quirk in Tirpitz's imagination, but a deeplyheld belief of many in the German Navy (especially those who had served on the overseas stations and seen the trade rivalry in action), and to a lesser extent in the rest of the government 19 .
Tirpitz in particular was one of the more extreme advocates of these beliefs. As a young naval student, he had listened to and talked with Treitschke: later, he fully accepted Mahan's concepts upon the battlefleet and sea-power and world empire. The ideas of both men were »married« together during his Immediatvortrag of September 28th, 1899. At this meeting, Tirpitz emphasised that:
the creation of an effective fleet is an absolute necessity for Germany, without which she will encounter ruin. 4 world powers. Russia, England, America and Germany. Since 2 of these world powers can only be reached by sea, then national power at sea (should be) predominant. Salisbury's speedi: the great states become greater and stronger, the small smaller and weaker, is also my view. Since Germany is particularly backward with regard to sea power, it is a vital matter for her, as a world power and cultural state, to make up for this neglect 20 .
Furthermore, Tirpitz held that Germany's great commercial expansion overseas was more or less bound to lead her to »points of contact and conflict with other nations, therefore power (sea-power) vital if Germany will not quickly go under« 21 . In particular, he felt that the Anglo-German trade rivalry, the effects of which he greatly exaggerated, pointed to England as being Germany's »most dangerous enemy at sea« 22 . The British, declared an Admiralty Staff memorandum of 1900, treated other peoples -apart from her North American cousinsas more or less barbarians and »these factors made a clash sooner or later very probable« 23 . Tirpitz therefore deemed it advisable, and indeed his duty, to prepare his country's defences for a possible conflict and to build up a larger fleet. Yet even if his mind was permeated with much social Darwinism, it would still appear that his motives were primarily defensive.
But the Admiral's calculations did not stop there. The force which he was creating may have appeared defensively-inclined in his and Bülow's speeches to the Reichstag, but in its actuality -38 battleships equipped and trained for operations between the Thames and Heligoland -and in his less public calculations and utterances, it was a very offensive weapon. It was offensive, primarily, because of the means to which it was going to be put and this is where the true connection between the striving for Weltpolitik and the anti-British aspect comes in. Stated starkly and simply, Tirpitz's battlefleet was to be used as a lever "Tirpitz: Erinnerungen, 163, whereby the overseas gains and successes necessary to allow the continuous growth of Germany into the outside world and to satisfy the Kaiser and the German public were to be prized from those »dying« empires which the British would probably seek to protect from German occupation, i. e. the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and Danish colonies, which all figure so often in the German memoranda of this period 24 . If the British stood by or fell badi before the steady German demand for fresh markets, trading advantages, colonies and coaling stations in any case, then well and good: if they did not, then some leverage would have to be applied. Only this can properly explain Tirpitz's earlier statement that Britain »is also the enemy against which we most urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor« 26 . That was in 1897, when a force of 19 battleships was being asked for. In the same vein ran an Admiralty Staff memorandum of 1900, which declared that »the possession of a fleet of 38 high quality battleships has a different meaning politically than a defensive one of 19 ships« 2 ®. The motive was the same, only the demand was doubled. The German battlefleet was a short cut to Weltpolitik, which would be successfully realised through neutralising Britain's ability to check the outward expansion of Europe's most powerful state. This was what Tirpitz meant when he wrote that »The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea: it worked indeed over the whole globe without us needing to deploy out (our forces) somewhere« 27 . Building warships to remain in the North Sea and planning on a world policy simply didn't make sense otherwise.
But the clearest evidence that this was what was in his mind, apart from the many memoranda about the colonial territories of smaller nations and his avowedly Darwinistic beliefs, emerges from the Immediatvortrag of September 28th, 1899. The force he was planning to build, Tirpitz promised the Kaiser, would give Germany a fleet only second in size to the Royal Navy.
But we have an undoubtedly good chance against England also through geographical situation, weapon system, mobilisation, torpedo-boats, tactical training, methodically organised structure and the unified leadership through the Monarch. Apart from this ratio for fighting, which would certainly not be without prospects for us, then out of overall political grounds and from the purely sensible viewpoint of the business man, England will have lost every inclination to attack us and as a result concede to Your Majesty sudo a measure of naval mastery and enable Your Majesty to carry out a great overseas policy 2e .
In other words, the dislike of England was based upon the fear that, as another memorandum put it, she would be able »to stunt Germany's ability to carry out Weltpolitik for generations« 2 ®.
Here is the two-sided nature of Tirpitz's policy in its clearest form. Of course the fleet had a defensive function, and of course it was built out of fear of an English attack. But sudi an attack, he believed, would most likely be caused by the irresistable German advance into markets hitherto dominated by the British merchants or by some conflict over the future of the colonial territories of »dying« u On these colonial ambitions, see BA-MA 5174a, Adm, Oberseeische Flottenstfizpunkte, Vols. nations. The Admiral's long-term scheme was to create such a threat to the British that they would be unwilling to risk their naval supremacy by forcibly preventing the German expansion. War was not expected -although if it came Germany would be able to hold her own in the North Sea -for the »businesslike« British would clearly prefer to do a deal with Germany. Tirpitz was advocating a policy of brinkmanship long before the term as such was recognised.
These are only a few pieces of evidence. Many more can be found in the archives and in the private papers of Tirpitz, Senden and others to indicate firmly that they all anticipated »a new partition of the globe«, that they expected Germany would take the foremost part in this process but that she would continually encounter the rivalry of Britain and that a »world-political freedom« would only be reached when she had constructed a vast fleet to neutralise sudi opposition. As early as 1895, Tirpitz had spoken of the need to build a large Navy as a »power factor, which Germany absolutely requires in peace as well as war, if she is not to abandon her position in the ranks of the great powers«. In 1903, the Navy felt that »if we wish to promote a powerful overseas policy and to secure worthwhile colonies, we must be prepared in the first line for a clash with England or America«. In bringing forward sudi pieces of evidence, and many others besides, Dr. Berghahn has performed a valuable service in pointing out the true aims and motives of Tirpitz's naval policy 80 .
Hence, of course, the Admiral's insistence upon a battlefleet in the North Sea. Without it, there could be no lever. When Valois and other advocates of the jeune école campaigned for the construction of a large number of powerful armoured cruisers in 1899, Tirpitz angrily wrote: Valois says one must attack England where she is weak. In fact, he makes England's seven overseas squadrons ready against us, while on account of her foreign policy commitments she can only utilise a very small part of these ships in the North Sea. England's weak point is therefore the North Sea, for here we can concentrate our entire force 31 .
Little of this could be said in public, however, as Tirpitz admitted to the military representative of Saxony at the end of 1899: »One could not say directly that the fleet increase is in the first line against England, with whom we must doubtless come into conflict in the next century in some part of the earth, be it out of economic rivalry or as a consequence of colonial disputes'*. « The Second Navy Law was therefore »dressed up« in the garb of a defensive measure and, in this respect, it was assured of a successful reading in the Reidistag. As sudi, it could also be defended by later historians. Nevertheless, the confidential documents reveal that it possessed a further aspect whidi it is impossible to explain away in terms of Zeitgeist or the needs of self-defence. It is here, in Tirpitz's plain intention to use the future battlefleet as a threat against the British should they oppose Germany's overseas expansion, that the excuse that the German naval programme was no different from all others in this age of the »new navalism« falls down. Down, too, falls the idea that Tirpitz was not anti-English.
And this was why getting through the »danger zone« was so crucial to Tirpitz and Biilow. It was not just that they would readi a stage where they would be free from atta di by the Royal Navy but that, given adroit diplomacy and the avoid-ance of premature confrontations with Britain on the one hand and the steady construction of battleships on the other, they would eventually be in a position to use the lever effectively. Only when she safely came out of the danger zone would Germany be free to play at Weltpolitik without hindrance. They had to run this risk, Tirpitz believed, or give away a great future for Germany. What other alternative was there to ensure that the German expansion was not diecked, to hit the Social Democrats (traditionally pro-British) and divert the attention of the mass electorate from Germany's internal condition, and to satisfy the demands of the Kaiser, the pressure groups and the newspapers forjjreat overseas successes?
This also explains why there was little or no mention of France and Russia in the mass of documents, letters and speedies on the Second Navy Law. For, although Russia was making threatening noises about Germany's plans for a Bagdad railway in 1899 and although some of the French colonies would have been welcome acquisitions, these powers were not generally regarded as either standing in Germany's path of expansion or having mudi to offer the Kaiser and the colonial pressure groups at home. Secondly, it was mudi more dangerous to threaten France or Russia, since both had land frontiers with, and standing armies close to, Germany and they would probably fight together against her. And finally, even if they were obstructing Germany, even if they had tempting colonies, and even if they were therefore to be threatened, building battleships was not the way to obtain concessions from either power. As Selborne pointed out, the »deliberate diminution of the military strength which Germany might otherwise have attained in relation to France and Russia »revealed how mudi Germany had Britain in mind when building this new Navy 83 . This was why, when Tirpitz wrote of a lever working over the whole globe, he meant a lever against Britain.
Yet this concept of a military lever against Great Britain, however convincing it may have been to Tirpitz's confidential circle of listeners, contained grave errors, both in the event of peace, or war. In the former case, it simply was not practical peacetime politics to exert pressure from the North Sea upon the course of events overseas. In a repetition of a clash over the Transvaal or Samoa, for example, could the knife really be moved nearer the jugular vein, that is, could the German battlefleet cruise threateningly towards the Thames estuary without provoking an entirely different reaction on the British side from the one expected by Tirpitz? In such circumstances, war would seem to be almost inevitable: at the very least, the British would seek to neutralise this threat as quickly as possible rather than concede to the German viewpoint in the colonial quarrel, for they could never be sure that the Germans would not raise their demands or repeat this manoeuvre at a later date. No British government could possibly survive the storm which would follow any concessions by them in such an event.
Of course, Tirpitz probably never planned to move his fleet towards the Thames at all and hoped that the mere threat of this happening would be enough. However, the scheme had flaws from the technical viewpoint also, even had it to be put into effect. If the German battleships moved quickly enough, they could, given the known distribution of the Royal Navy in 1900 (and assumed for the years following), be at the Thames before any considerable British forces arrived and perhaps before the British public and press learnt of the threat and pushed It is perhaps a significant enough comment upon the impracticality of the lever theory that, only three weeks after the passing of the Second Navy Law, the whole II. Division of the First Battle Squadron (i. e. 4 battleships) was ordered out to China to partake in the events whidi followed the Boxer rebellion there 94 . This did, of course, have a military purpose, the destruction of the Taku forts whidi cruiser fire could not seriously damage; but the main purpose must be seen as a public indication, to the Chinese that Germany was a nation to be respected, and to the other powers that Germany was to be heard before any decisions regarding the future of the Chinese empire were made. The decision to proceed with the journey, when the Division learnt at Singapore that the forts had been destroyed and Peking relieved two weeks earlier, and especially the decision to keep this battleship force in the Far East for a year afterwards, can only be explained by sudi motives. It would indeed be interesting to know Tirpitz's thoughts on the despatdi of such vessels, a clear contradiction of his whole strategic plan. It would also be interesting to learn of his reactions to the news of the crews' discomforts in the hot regions (there was little or no ventilation in these ships, designed for North Sea operations), to the continual dependence upon British ports on the journey and the often inadequate and unhelpful service of the British coaling contractors, to the necessity of repairing at the British dockyard in Hongkong, and to the crowning blow, that the battleships were employed in Chinese waters only in a cruiser capacity -they patrolled outside some Boxerheld ports, waiting for the insignificant Chinese fleet to venture forth, which needless to say did not occur 35 . Everything about the operation flouted the concepts which Tirpitz had been so patiently expounding for the previous years. It might be true to say that other nations were doing the same at this time when the situation in China was so grave; but these powers did not have a plan of exercising influence in the world through a battlefleet based in the North Sea.
It could perhaps be argued that this lever theory would not work until the German fleet had been built up to its planned strength, but such an argument also fails to convince. The principle of »getting thar fustest with the mustest« wherever the trouble occurred held true in naval affairs also. It revealed itself in the despatdi of such a large force to the Philippines in 1898, when the possibility of obtaining a coaling station seemed to arise 36 giving consideration to the idea of actually taking over Delagoa Bay at the beginning of the Boer War, the Kaiser gave out orders for the seizure of Tiger Bay in Angola should London go ahead with the rumoured plan 37 . Whatever the strength of the German Navy in home waters, it is difficult to visualise the Kaiser holding bads his fleet while the warships of the other nations rushed out to where the potential colonial pickings were. To postulate, as Tirpitz did, that battleships were only to function in a certain area was to fall into the simple military error of attempting to pre-judge and predetermine an action before the needs of that particular situation were revealed. The basic fact was that the lever principle could not work in peacetime, either as a way to protect German interests in a colonial quarrel, or to pressure Britain, or to affect rapidly-dianging developments on the other side of the globe.
This »dagger at the throat« strategy as a means of protecting German overseas interests could also be seen to have flaws in it when applied in a war with Great Britain. For in such an event, despite the protestations of the German fleet propagandists, their colonies would be taken and their vast merdiant shipping would be swept from the seas without much regard to what was happening in the Heligoland-Thames area, simply because the agencies involved in such actions were to a large extent independent of the North Sea strategy. Thus the British selfgoverning colonies, which had long resented the nearby presence of German colonies, would at the first chance seek to overrun these lands without much encouragement (or perhaps even help) from London. Secondly, there was always a large enough number of British cruisers, apart from those engaged in scouting for the battlefleets in home waters, to paralyse German shipping routes and to cut her off from her vast foreign trade by sea. Britain's advantageous geographical and therefore strategical position, and Germany's disadvantageous one, tilted the balance still further. Nor does the purely defensive German argument, that their fleet must be strong enough to defend their own coastline and harbour entrances and thus prevent the evils of blockade, make mudi sense. Their great overseas commerce, the protection of whidi was constantly emphasised by the Navy propagandists, had to be defended, not in German coastal waters alone, but on the high seas. And until Germany had control of the high seas, her shipping was, strategically speaking, as much at the mercy of the British cruisers after the battleship increases as before them.
Of course, mudi of the Navy's propaganda about the protection of colonies, trade routes and overseas interests was fabricated for the German public as a whole, for the uncommitted members of the Reichstag, and especially for the colonial pressure groups, the industrial and shipping concerns, and the commercial middle classes. If it had little strategic reality, that did not bother Tirpitz and he was the first to admit this on less public occasions. Indeed, the whole attitude of the naval planners in the event of a war with Britain indicated that this, their most publiclyavowed task, was in fact a »non-starter«. Their war plans accepted without mudi apparent regret that the British would seize German overseas interests, and they concentrated instead upon recouping their losses in the North Sea. Requests from the Colonial Ministry at a far later stage, when Germany possessed the world's second largest Navy, for assistance in defending the colonies in wartime, were »' AA, England 78 nr. 1 Seer., Vol. 13, Bülow to AA no. 104, Top Secret, 11.9.1899. treated with cold contempt by the Reichsmarineamt® 8 . To the Reidistag, however, Tirpitz was content to give out details upon the great expansion of Germany overseas, and then simply to state that the German battlefleet in the North Sea would defend those interests. Nauticus of 1900 reported upon the acquisition of Samoa and the need to protect Germany's possessions in the Pacific, and then blithely commented: »Only a well-esteemed naval power, represented by a strong battlefleet at home, provides such protection 89 .« That the German Navy could make sudi pronouncements and get away with them without undergoing heavy parliamentary and press criticism over the glaring logic gap (in this case, of protecting Samoa by a fleet some 11 000 miles away) is even more surprising. The government's foreign, or internal, or financial policies might be vigorously attacked from the various sides, but it appears that noone wished to, or even thought of, criticising Tirpitz's strategical dispositions. Only Eugene Richter really referred to the paradox, but then turned to discuss other aspects of the measure 40 . Where were the German equivalents of the naval theorists and amateur strategists, sudi as Sir Charles Dilke, Arnold White, Fred Jane, Brassey, Corbett and others who abounded in Britain and who were ready to criticise their government's naval policy whenever they thought it necessary? Was it that the German layman feared to discuss what was judged to be a strictly service matter? Was this, the leaving of all strategy questions to the military, in its way a sort of negative aspect of militarism 41 ?
To the German Navy itself, the most important task was the defence of the coastal waters and, after that, of the North Sea. This strategy, of which only the defensive part was explained to the Reichstag, depended heavily upon the »risk theory« calculations and the idea of warding off any possible British attacks. But, as we have seen, it also had an offensive side to it. Few service officers think otherwise, and Tirpitz here was no exception. The whole Navy, from the Kaiser downwards, accepted Mahan's view that the only proper strategy was to go forth with one's battlefleet and to take control of the seas. The coastal defence vessels were to be scrapped because they were just that, defence vessels. Tirpitz was angered at the Admiralty Staff's 1899 manoeuvre plans because they seemed to indicate »Kleinkrieg« and the avoidance of a decisive battle 42 . Moreover, he strongly believed that only an offensive fleet would increase Germany's »alliance-worthiness«. He attacked defence of the coasts through ships as »unprofitable and purposeless«: the defensive gave the enemy an advantage in neutral oceans, and contradicted the »natural destiny of a warship and a fleet«, which was the offensive 43 .
Yet how was the German fleet to act offensively in war, given its existing numerical inferiority (which would continue for a very long time always exist) and given the current strategical belief that the attacking force required a I 1 /« to 1 superiority in numbers over the defensive one? First of all, this plan depended to a great extent upon the continuance of the Royal Navy's fleet dispositions, i. e. upon the continued existence of other pressures upon the British Empire whidi forced the stationing of a large part of the British fleet in regions far from the North Sea. For example, of the 62 battleships ready or building in 1897, only 32 were assigned to home waters 44 . Against these, the German battlefleet would have a considerable chance of success. Secondly, Tirpitz hoped to further close the gap by his constant emphasis upon superior training, the use of torpedo-boats to reduce the enemy's fleet, and especially the better construction of the German battleships. Finally, when he spoke of the »offensive«, he did not really mean that the German battleships would hurl themselves against the Thames estuary but that it would be able to issue forth to attack any British forces which attempted to raid or blockade: it was, in other words, an offensive capability and not an offensive strategy.
Of course, even the strategy itself might have changed had the Royal Navy continued to maintain its fleet dispositions of the 1890s, or had the German warship construction eventually closed the gap with the British. But neither of these eventualities occurred, and the German strategy thus remained basically the same from the drafting of their first operations plans until the actual war itself 45 . What is astonishing is that in 1900 -and indeed until some time afterwardsthe German Navy really believed that the British would have to come across the North Sea and fight their opponent on very unfavourable terms to themselves. That disturbing question »But what if they don't come over« was dismissed as impossible 46 . Only some years later was the glaring fallacy in this German strategy made clear. Thus, before then, the German war plans talk calmly of a close blockade of the German coast -in the Baltic as well as the North Sea -as the main task for the Royal Navy without ever apparently considering an alternative strategy 47 .
There were a number of sound reasons, the Admiralty Staff thought, whidi supported this supposition. Firstly, the close blockade was still regarded by many to be the normal strategy of the more powerful Navy, especially by those imbued with Mahan's story of the Royal Navy in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 48 . Secondly, they considered that:
England can only force us to peace if she carries out war in Europe as energetically as possible. The more forcibly this occurs on our own coasts, the quicker will peace probably be brought about and the more improbable it is for Germany to bring alliances together which could be dangerous for England 49 .
Thirdly, particular stress was laid upon »tradition and the But there existed equally or even more valid points against this assumption at that time, whidi Tirpitz and the German Navy do not appear to have considered. The re-coaling difficulties caused by permanently maintaining modern battleships near the enemy's harbours were naturally mudi greater than those faced by Nelson's »far-distant, storm-beaten« ships. Moreover, »the hazards increased tremendously after 1900. Mines, torpedoes, submarines, and long-range coastal ordnance had by then blown the idea of close blockade to bits« 61 . Although the British did not officially and absolutely change their policy until almost the eve of war, close blockade was a strategy which had long lain under a cloud of suspicion 62 . Was there no suspicion on the German side also at the turn of the century?
Other, non-tedinical factors throw even greater doubt upon this fixed belief that the British would come across the North Sea immediately and carry out a policy of close blockade with its consequent losses whidi would in turn give Germany the opportunity she had been waiting for to make a sortie and attack the depleted enemy forces. Tirpitz himself had some years earlier launched a strong attack upon the High Command's plans for a war against France with the following words: The operations plan of the High Command bases itself upon the strategic defensive in the Baltic and the North Sea. Here one will wait for the enemy and then strike. The purpose is to keep open our imports. I now indeed believe that the enemy will not come at first, and that we will then wait with our great fleet while France without mudi sacrifice cuts off 2/3rds to 3/4s of our imports in the Channel and north of England 63 .
If Tirpitz believed then that the French Navy would prefer to wait, to pick off the German merchant marine and assemble their whole fleet in the meantime, why should this strategy not be adopted by the Royal Navy also? Merely because of their tradition and their natural aggressiveness? It was a dubious assumption, which appears even more so when one considers that it was formulated long before the British press, Arthur Lee and Fisher began talking about a preventive war and the sudden »Copenhagening« of the German fleet.
The final and most damning objection to the viability of this German naval strategy lies, ironically enough, in the postulations of Tirpitz's risk theory. The German Navy was to be so large and strong that even the greatest sea-power would have its control of the oceans endangered by attacking it. Why then was it believed that the enemy would adopt an aggressive war strategy at all? Surely it would be wiser for the throw their vessels into the German Bight when the Royal Navy was under the control of sudi cautious men as Goschen and Selborne, and when (in Tirpitz's calculation) a large part of their fleet would be away on other stations? This latter point, that the German Navy would only be facing a part of the Royal Navy, is also open to doubt, even in those troubled years when the FrancoRussian alliance represented the greatest danger to British interests overseas and when Tirpitz and Bülow hoped to take advantage of this by being able to tilt the naval balance. In his preparation for the First Navy Law, Tirpitz believed that: a tactically manoeuvrable body of two well-trained squadrons of high quality battleships would themselves nave prospects of victory against the part of the English battlefleet which would be employed against the German fleet under normal political condition 6δ .
Moreover, this concept remained equally important in the calculations which surrounded the Second Navy Law. It seems astonishing, therefore, that it was exactly at this time (November-December 1899) that the offensive German operations plan against Britain was abolished because of its dubious premise that war would occur suddenly and that the German battlefleet would be able to rush across to the Thames estuary and destroy whatever British forces it found there. This was replaced with the more realistic assessment that a period of tension was bound to occur between the two countries before an armed clash took place 56 . Tirpitz (but not the Admiralty Staff) seems to have still failed to appreciate that war does not break out under normal political conditions, but in time of stress, and that the period before the actual hostilities would be used by the British to summon home its Channel and Mediterranean fleets. And to return to the previous argument, the stronger the fleet Tirpitz created, the greater the likelihood of the British waiting for such reinforcements.
Tirpitz would answer that the continuous antagonism between Britain and the Dual Alliance, upon which he and Bülow based so much of their policy, prevented the Royal Navy from withdrawing its ships from the Far East, the Mediterranean and elsewhere, but this argument also appears extremely questionable. The choice lay between areas where potential threats existed to British interests, sudi as in the Far East, and a region (the North Sea) where British national security -given the supposition that an Anglo-German conflict was imminent -was involved, and there could be no doubt that to the British the latter was the most important. It was extremely erroneous to suppose that the South China Sea or the Eastern Mediterranean could ever be as vital to Britain as the North Sea. In any case, as the Germans were well aware, withdrawal from the Mediterranean was quite often discussed in the British press 87 . When faced with the stark dioice, the Englishman would look to his moat.
Tirpitz's strategy made far more sense if he could rely upon the active support of the Frendi and Russian forces in the event of a war with Britain. The diief naval battleground would still be the North Sea, but the German Navy would then be in a mudi stronger position, reinforced by the Russian Baltic and Frendi Northern fleets, and with the British under heavy pressure elsewhere in the world. Tirpitz himself often stressed the »alliance-worthiness« of the Navy he was building up and he seems on the surface to have had a particular regard for an alliance with Russia 58 . In the view of the Admiralty Staff also, Russia would find Germany a most valuable ally in the event of an Anglo-Russian conflict, but of course »only when she [Germany] has completed her naval armaments« 59 . This German naval thinking obviously reflected the theories expressed by the press and certain diplomatists around the turn of the century that a continental alliance against Britain was a possibility, especially so long as she was bogged down in the Boer War 60 .
Even so, it is hard to believe that either Tirpitz or the German Admiralty Staff could have given mudi credit to these theories in view of the firm and unshakeable determination of Wilhelm and Biilow at this time that they were not going to get involved in an anti-British coalition. An authoritative survey of the published documents has shown how consistently these two men opposed the idea of aligning themselves on the side of the Dual Alliance® 1 . Biilow was after the »free hand«, the chance to operate independently between Britain and Russia and to reap the benefits of this advantageous position. The threat of going along with the Dual Alliance was a useful ploy with which to gain colonial concessions from the British, as in the Samoan affair, but to actually enter the Franco-Russian camp would so arouse London's anger and mistrust that Germany would never again obtain concessions. When it came to a question of Weltpolitik, Germany was to a great extent dependent upon British goodwill, and he knew it -hence his support for the battleship programme, whidi he believed would reduce this dependenceand he was not going to lose Germany's middle position and British friendship for Tirpitz's plans. Moreover, Biilow declined to consider any alliance with Russia until France publicly and permanently renounced any ideas of recovering Alsace-Lorraine; and this, as he discovered precisely in 1899 and 1900, Russia would not press France to do® 2 . Biilow was also deeply conscious at this time that France was in no way willing to consider sudi a step® 3 . His wish that France wallow deeper into the mire of the Dreyfus affair and thus scandalise and disgust the world is hardly an attitude one would entertain about a potential ally® 4 . Unless Germany was safe in Europe, therefore, it was foolishness to arouse British enmity, and her own border security, by joining Russia.
It could be argued that Biilow strove to maintain at least correct relations with Britain until the danger zone had passed; but this does not avoid the central problem that Germany would not bind herself to the Dual Alliance until France had dianged her views upon Alsace-Lorraine and Russia abandoned her support of France. Neither of these possibilities appeared within the realm of practical politics around the year 1900. It seems scarcely credible that Tirpitz, as Navy Minister and Prussian Minister of State, as a person having frequent and close contact with Wilhelm and Bülow, and as someone having an obvious interest in Germany's foreign relations, was not aware of the apparent divergence between his own and Bülow's respective beliefs upon their relations to Britain and the Dual Alliance. It is posible that he had only developed this idea of »alliance-worthiness« to make the British more amenable to German pressure, and that he seized upon it again after the war to cover up his own miscalculations. Either he was misinformed in 1900 or, more probably, he was falsifying his real knowledge of affairs when writing his memoirs. He also seems to have been rather unjustified in criticising the fact that German foreign policy did not follow the prerequisites necessary for a successful fleet policy, although he in no way admits that it was his and Bülow's task to coordinate the two® 5 : for to have the foreign policy trailing along behind her naval policy was like putting the cart before the horse. There was a chronic lack of »priority-fixing« in German policy at the turn of the century, with the Navy striking out on an anti-British line, high finance reaching towards Turkey and the Near East, the Army planning as ever for their two-front war and giving little regard to a conflict with Britain, while Bíilow tried to fulfil the impossible task of making German policy serve all these conflicting aims.
The remaining flaws in Tirpitz's construction of an anti-British fleet and the uses to which he intended to put it have been criticised elsewhere 6 ®. The basic error was to believe that the British could be forced into concessions by the creation of this lever, and then to persist in his conviction that the British were being too suspicious and wildly wrong to think of his Navy as a threat. How would Germany have reacted had the British begun to build a vast army with the ability to fight in Europe but nowhere else, had explained that they had to consider a war with the strongest military power then existing, and had made ominous noises about the »alliance-worthiness« of this new force to Germany's rivals? Would she have compromised with this new force, or would she have sought to neutralise it, perhaps by reorganising her military dispositions and strategy, perhaps even by making alterations in her foreign policy and commitments? The natural reaction to pressure, to any threat, is to seek some means of neutralising or destroying it. Did Tirpitz really think that the British would react differently?
Moreover, did he believe that everything would go as smoothly as his rigid plan contemplated, that Germany would lie quiet for a number of years and then suddenly, ripping the covers from her great fleet, reveal this new factor in the European political balance? The whole idea of the danger zone, as Professor Schüssler points out® 7 , was incredibly myopic, for the feverish battleship construction and the strident anglophobia were bound to be noticed before long, and no amount of clever diplomacy on Bülow's part or false explanations of the fleet's purpose would be able to prevent British alarm or reaction to this. The quicker and larger the German battlefleet grew, the more excitedly the British would react; and the more ships the British constructed as an answer, the harder it was for Gíermany to come clear of the danger zone. Instead of ridding his country of insecurity, Tirpitz brought her into an even more precarious position.
It is therefore rather ironic to discover that, after the war, Biilow told Tirpitz that »in the building of our fleet we laid the main weight too one-sidedly upon the construction of great battleships«. As to the place of the Anglo-German naval race in the causes of the First World War, the former Chancellor revealed similar regrets over the policy he had once so enthusiastically championed: You are entirely right when you say that the war was not caused by the fleet, certainly not through our relationship to England. We were dragged into the war through our clumsy handling of a Balkan problem. But there is the question, whether France and particularly Russia would have let it come to war had the public opinion in England not been so greatly enraged precisely at the construction of our great ships® 8 .
Like all historians, including the present author, Biilow could be wise after the event. At the time, however, he seems to have shown no hesitation about the course Wilhelmine Germany was so resolutely taking.
Another major criticism is that the vast sums spent upon creating the world's second largest Navy could have been better employed, given Germany's precarious geographical position between a hostile France and a suspicious Russia, in buttressing her own Army and the defence of her own borders. Of course they could have, but this argument appears to be bludgeoning Tirpitz with rather too blunt a stick: a Navy was bound to take money and men which could have been used for the Army and, in any case, the Army estimates in 1914 were four times that of the Navy's and had been climbing steadily despite the expansion of the fleet. Furthermore, a far larger percentage of the Frendi and Russian military expenditures were devoted to their fleets than was the case in Germany 69 . If the Kaiser was diverting funds from his own Army, he was also indirectly diverting them from the armies of Germany's enemies. It is more pertinent to ask whether Tirpitz ever seriously believed it possible to reduce the Army to the junior role in Germany's defence system. For if he did not, then his hopes and calculations about challenging the Royal Navy do not make sense. In her population and heavy industry Germany might be superior to Britain but this fact, however mudi it must have satisfied Tirpitz, could not be translated into naval terms unless Germany diverted the same proportion of her military expenditure to the fleet as Britain did. It was not that Tirpitz's belief in the growth of Germany's power was exaggerated but that, whereas Germany spent only 20 % of her military expenditure on the fleet and 80 °/o on the Army Britain spent 61 % on the fleet and only 39 %> (all 1914 figures) on her Army, whidi prevented his dream from being realised 70 . To grasp the primacy of the seas from Britain, he would first of all have to grasp the primacy of Germany's defence system from the Army. Not only were the British able to stand the financial strain better than the Germans, but they also managed to upset one of Tirpitz's key calculations: the German technical superiority in ship design. The construction of the Dreadnought, which has been regarded by many as offering Tirpitz his golden chance, was nothing of the sort. The news of this new ship not only rendered obsolete all of the his recently-built battleships, but it upset all his design and construction calculations for a certain while. And, when he decided to follow up with German dreadnoughts, the cost was appalling. Moreover, the British decision to build 8 sudi vessels in one year showed that the prospects of clearing the danger period were nil 71 .
The following is also worthy of note. By the First Navy Law, Tirpitz had created a force which would hopefully be sufficient to defend Germany's coastline in the event of a war with France and Russia. From the strategical viewpoint also, these were the tasks which the German Navy could most naturally and easily carry out 72 . Despite this, the German government was not satisfied, for it sought a means of being able to check a British attempt to restrict their freedom of action and believed it could achieve this by creating a larger battlefleet. This development contributed in a crucial way to the alienation of the British government and people and helped to propel them into the arms of France; and yet in the end it never fulfilled any of the political tasks which Tirpitz and Biilow foresaw for it in 1899. And the crowning irony of it all was that this creation of a larger battlefleet, with all the disastrous political consequences which followed for Germany, in no way improved the military and strategic capacity of the German fleet against Britain. The Second Navy Law and the definite swing into an antiBritish posture proved as militarily useless for Germany as it was politically disastrous. Only in relation to the fleets of the Dual Alliance was this measure a benefit: yet this could hardly be regarded as a fair consolation if it brought the Royal Navy onto the scales against her.
What was Tirpitz really looking for? Obviously, it was not just the adequate protection of Germany's overseas interests, shipping and colonies. Nor can one accept that he was out to create a greater »alliance-worthiness« for Germany, for that was a means and not the end itself. His yearnings for cooperation with Russia often seem to be a part defensive, part wishful reaction to the noose he had helped to draw around Germany's nedt. Moreover, when one considers the hopelessness of the actual tasks blithely outlined for the new German Navy at the time of the Second Navy Law, it is also difficult to believe that Tirpitz personally placed mudi stress upon the military and strategic advantages whidi his 38 battleships would confer upon Germany. It seems increasingly clear that what Tirpitz was really seeking, as many studies have pointed out, was a political understanding with Britain 73 . This would, of course, be an understanding upon Germany's terms, since for internal reasons she could no longer tolerate being pushed back by the British in her many expansionist moves. Tirpitz and Biilow were not people who could approach the British government for a general understanding, and in any case they feared rejection by Salisbury, who was becoming more and more stubborn about »deals« with Germany. Instead they planned to make the British come to them by creating a force, whidi, under the guise of protecting Germany's overseas interests, was to pose a threat to Britain's naval supremacy and therefore to her freedom of action. »Through pressures outside Europe, through coercion in naval armaments as well as going to the limits of England's financial, technical and personnel capacities, he [Tirpitz] sought to bring the statesmen in London around to seek an understanding with Germany 74 .« Yet sudi a view, that Tirpitz was out to effect an Anglo-German arrangement of some sort, is really a charitable and short-term interpretation of his aims and methods. This is not to deny that certain understandings with the British would have been opposed by him had they been favourable to Germany. But the more one thinks of the pressures behind the government for unrestricted expansion and an anti-British policy, of the ever-growing strength of Germany economically and militarily, of the German government's determination to avoid a two-front war, and of the Kaiser's hopes of one day challenging the Royal Navy, the less one can accept the idea that the Anglo-German understanding would be anything other than a short-lived and one-sided affair. By attracting the attention of the German people and by neutralising the British for a required number of years, the German fleet was to be both the symbol and the instrument of Germany's rise to world power. The ambitions of the Second Reich were outpacing all that Europe could offer her, and her attention was turning to the outside world, a world as traditionally dominated by the British and their Navy as Europe had been traditionally dominated before 1870 by France and her Army. It would, at some future stage, be found as necessary to break the British domination to secure full freedom of action in the outside world as it had been to break France for freedom of action in Europe.
For Tirpitz, with his Darwinistic view of political developments, could not accept the idea that Britain and Germany could permanently cooperate together. Their commercial rivalry prevented an alliance from ever coming into being and Germany had to have a large fleet if she were not to become an »Ackerbauland«. Yet the trade rivalries for the markets of the world would continue, even if a temporary arrangement was readied with Britain 75 . More was needed, therefore. The German fleet, while it was small, might play the part of tilting the balance between the Dual Alliance and Britain: while somewhat larger and given certain circumstances, it might without other assistance put pressure upon Britain over various matters: but when it reached the size whidi Tirpitz and the Kaiser ideally desired for it, this fleet would be used to sweep British naval control from the seas. Whether this was done by war or by a series of British concessions and retreats was irrelevant, although the latter would be much preferred. What did matter was the creation of a state of security for Germany's growing overseas commitments, and to fulfil this condition the Royal Navy had to be overhauled and contained. Sudi hopes existed at the turn of the century in a vague form, even if they were changed to denials that their fleet was anything other than a defensive force a few years later; and even if the British naval changes and the almost simultaneous diplomatic revolution forced Tirpitz and Wilhelm to think more of encirclement than expansion, and more in terms of defence than offence. This is a massive charge to lay at the door of Tirpitz, and possibly one will never be able to substantiate it with documents. For, while the Admiral thought in terms of decades and not of years, he was no idle dreamer and his letters and memoranda focussed chiefly upon the problems of the present. Moreover, this aim, if it ever existed in concrete form, would only have lasted for a few years from the period of optimism around the turn of the century to the more sobering times after 1905. Yet these were precisely the years when the German Navy was so preoccupied with the passing and execution of the Second Navy Law that it would have been foolhardy of the Reidismarineamt to come forward with plans for further ™ Tirpitz: Erinnerungen, p. 167. major increases. Even as early as 1903, the financial position was not looking so good.
Nevertheless, something remains to give the historian a faint trace of this grander design. Part of it comes from contemporary memoirs and letters, which are chiefly second-hand accounts and therefore have to be treated with some reserve. However, it would appear that Tirpitz occasionally expressed some future hopes in his private conversations with his political colleagues. As early as 1897, he had told Count Monts that the deep-rooted objection in Britain to conscription would prevent the government in London from maintaining a certain distance between the strengths of the two fleets, while: We could in contrast provide a strong reserve of trained crews from the yearly intake of around 20 000 recruits into the Navy, in comparison to their naval reserve which was scarcely worth noting, and eventually with certainty provide the same number of ships as the English 76 .
A year later, Tirpitz warned Hohenlohe that: all policy hostile to England must be left alone until we have a fleet which is as strong as the English. Ine alliance with Russia and France would not help us. The Russians cannot come over the mountains to India, they have enough to do to maintain their own Far Eastern possessions 77 .
Kühlmann also reported that Tirpitz seemed to have a genuine hope «to be able to outbuild the English fleet«, while Waldersee wondered whether the Kaiser ever realised that the extent of his fleet plans would provoke shodts if known 78 . Years before, the Empress Fredrick had noted that »William's one idea is to have a Navy which shall be larger and stronger than the British Navy«, and Holstein later wrote that one of the Kaiser's fixed principles was to create a fleet larger than the Royal Navy 79 . Eckardstein, talking with Tirpitz in October 1899, was amazed to hear the Admiral promising a mudi stiffer line towards the British and Americans as soon as the German fleet was ready 80 . Another sharp though very knowledgeable critic of events in Berlin, the famous Times correspondent, George Saunders, felt at the same time that »Germany's one thought now is to get a fleet that can weigh in the balance against ours... For God's sake let us give her a wide berth 81 .« Certainly, none of these accounts, taken separately, are in any way conclusive: taken all together, however, they may be said to reveal some trace of the limitless ambitions of Tirpitz and Wilhelm.
More concrete evidence is provided by new research into the German naval archives. As mentioned above, the 38-battleship fleet provided by the Second Navy Bill was no final measure: Tirpitz was thinking of a 45-battleship fleet during the Immediatvortrag of September 28th, 1899. Moreover, Dr. Berghahn now reveals that even this cannot be considered as the Admiral's long-term goal. His twin aims were 1. to gradually wrest complete control over naval finances from the Reichstag, and thus to erase the hated »Parlamentsflotte«, and 2. to effect a building programme which allowed for the construction of 3 large and 3 small vessels every year, and their automatic replacement after 20 years instead of 25 years, i. e. a constant force of 60 battleships, controlled in every respect by the Monarch 82 . Had he achieved these aims, of course, then the temptation to proceed further and to increase the battleship construction rate to 4 per annum, as indeed occured in 1908, could well prove to be irresistable, always provided that the Reich's finances could carry the strain. And, since Dr. Berghahn has also shown that Tirpitz was hoping to take an ever-greater share of the defence budget from the Army, this cannot be regarded as mere fantasy.
Moreover, it is exactly in this 1899/1900 period that grave doubts were expressed in Berlin about the British ability to maintain their strength ratio over the German Navy. In December 1899, Tirpitz had learnt from the naval attaché in London that, because of technical, financial and especially personnel difficulties, it was impossible for the Royal Navy to answer in proportion the doubling of the German fleet. This answer greatly excited the Kaiser and his advisors, and it formed the basis for a number of important long memoranda upon the relative strengths of the two fleets 83 . Naturally, the attaché did not postulate the possibility of Germany ever managing to outbuild Britain in battleships, since he was only asked to report upon the latter's ability to respond to the immediate 38-battleship programme planned in Berlin. But since he assured the Reidismarineamt that the British would find it hard to make any large increases in their existing 60-battleship fleet, and since he reported in April 1901 that he believed the public and Parliament would refuse to finance the construction of more ships, it may be wondered whether Tirpitz did not indeed have hopes of an equally strong or even larger fleet in the far distant future. Certainly, the Kaiser's marginalia upon the newspaper commentary on Arnold White's agitation about the Mediterranean in 1901 indicates that he firmly believed that the Achilles' Heel of Britain lay in the lack of future naval personnel:
If the men are forthcoming! and where are they to come from? These ought to have been immediately replaced from Home! Why were they not? No men! It is not a question of distribution but of replacement!! Shilly-shally! all this does not touch the main question, where are the men to come from 84 ?! Furthermore, Berlin must have often worried that the exploitation of the split between Britain and the Dual Alliance could not perhaps always guarantee results. The political leverage Germany hoped to gain from being the tertius gaudens was dependent upon the moves of third parties and might not always be reliable. It would be far safer for Germany's Weltpolitik to be independent of the Franco-Russian alliance when confronting Britain in some future affair: in other words, it would be better to have a fleet at least equal to, and preferably superior to, the Royal Navy. If this idea seems preposterous, it must first of all be remembered that both Tirpitz and Biilow were thinking in terms of a decade or so into the future, that they expected Britain to have been at war with Russia before that time, and that they were always aware of Germany's great rate of industrial and commercial progress, a progress which was threatening the economic supremacy that Britain had held undiallenged since the beginnings of her Industrial Revolution. If Germany could exceed Britain in steel and chemical production, was catching her up fast in coal and pig-iron production and was drawing away 81 Berghahn, passim.
from her in terms of population, why not one day in warship production also 88 ? As we have seen, there are some faint hints that the German Navy was looking towards that distant future when the Kaiser would truly be »the Admiral of the Atlantic«, as he so pompously titled himself.
One final reason for believing that Tirpitz hoped eventually to create a fleet larger than the Royal Navy lies in the weaknesses of his war strategy towards Britain. Whatever his personal hopes and expressions for peace, he was well aware that war with Britain was a possibility which he must carefully plan for and consider, especially in view of his future schemes for the utilisation of his battlefleet. Yet what was the use of considering a war which Germany could not possibly win and where she would suffer the most: for even if the British themselves could not effect an invasion of Germany and thus her total defeat, they would take away her colonies and commerce and throw her back, economically weakened, to being solely a European power, surrounded by jealous neighbours. The fleet provided for by the First Navy Law, and even its doubling in the Second, could not defeat the British provided the latter took the necessary precautions whidi an Anglo-German conflict called for.
The only methods by which Germany could bring Britain to her knees were blockade or invasion. The former was an absolute impossibility for a 38 or 45-battleship fleet, due to geographical and logistical problems as well as its numerical inferiority 9 ®. Invasion was a mudi less impossible method of defeating Britain, and one to which the German Navy and General Staffs gave some consideration. Yet it was something which could not be securely carried out without the guaranteed control by the German Navy of the North Sea, i. e. without a guaranteed numerical superiority over the Royal Navy, not just in the first week of this operation but in the following weeks also. The vast invasion army not only had to be transported safely to England but its lines of communications back to Germany had to be maintained permanently since the landing force would be solely dependent upon them for reinforcements and supplies for the great land campaign. What diance was there of the General Staff risking the despatch across the North Sea of 2 Army Corps or more when they knew Tirpitz's 38 battleships could possibly be faced by 50 or 60 battleships before or shortly after the landings? If Germany could neither blockade nor invade Britain, she could not defeat her. The only safe way out was for Tirpitz to have a larger and more powerful fleet; and this he could not have failed to recognise.
There the argument must stop. Perhaps it has already gone too far. Perhaps Tirpitz only thought that the most he could ever adiieve would be the creation of a 60-battleship fleet. Even if that were so, it would have been an amazingly successful organisational and political feat, without parallel in recent world history. Nevertheless, this would have meant that he would have had to accept some form of numerical inferiority to the Royal Navy's overall strength: for who could doubt that the British, already possessing a fleet of 60 battleships or so, would not devote all their energies to the construction of many more vessels, would not bring back from distant seas their immense flotillas, would not seek an understanding with France over Africa and with Russia over Asia, as soon as we credit Tirpitz with the long-term vision of the world's greatest fleet, then we cannot fault him strategically -although the financial and political consequences would be immense. But if we admit that he only sought for a fleet of 38, 45 or even 60 battleships, then many of his strategical ideas and calculations must be called into question.
It will be asked, »But what else could Tirpitz have done?« A cruiser fleet was useless and these ships certainly could not have defended the German coasts against attacks from Frendi or Russian battleships in the event of war with the Dual Alliance. Was battleship construction not the norm of the period, rather than a particular German quirk? Everyone, even the smaller naval powers, was under Mahan's influence. Sudi questions miss the point. It was not the task of this piece of work to deny the existence of Zeitgeist, nor to criticise Tirpitz for not building cruisers or for building too many battleships. It was to point out that he was taking the German Navy from the very beginning of his time in office upon a deliberately anti-British line, with the fixed idea of neutralising British objections to Germany's overseas expansion; and that the strategic calculations upon which this policy was based were dubious, to say the least. There was, of course, another major motive -the internal political one -and here his calculations made much more sense and achieved a fair amount of success for a while, although the events of 1918/19 in Germany perhaps indicated how superficial this internal success had been. But strategically, his premises were shaky from the start and only if he had hoped to outbuild the British could any degree of certainty have been attached to them. The illustration of this shakiness, rather than any criticism of the construction of battleships per se, is the major point of this present work.
Finally it may be asked, what would the German Navy have done according to Tirpitz's calculations if the British had refused to accept understandings proposed by Germany and preferred to risk a confrontation during the period of incubation of the German battlefleet. Tirpitz's silence upon this point is deafening and suggests that it was a question which he strove to avoid meeting for fear of not being able to provide a satisfactory answer. He probably convinced himself that this would not happen or that Bülow's diplomacy would get Germany by. His plans for the political utilisation of the German fleet were as fixed and inflexible as the Navy Laws themselves, and allowed little or no room for an alarming possibility such as that one. This was, in essence, the crucial mistake of his entire policy, for he either failed to see, or refused to believe, that the world situation could radically alter during the 20 years of his fleet programmes. Foreign policies, swiftly changing and susceptible to many a new development, he apparently believed would be as predictable as Germany's planned shipyard production for some years in the future. The relatively quick British response to the German warship construction, the redeployment of the Royal Navy in the North Sea and the reorganisation of the entire British defence policy, the move by Britain closer and closer to France and eventually to Russia, could not shake his determination to carry on according to the plan, however tighter this tugged the knot of encirclement around Germany. An increase here, a quickening of the »Bautempo« there, in the belief that this was driving Britain to the wall, were the only answers he knew. He could never back down and de-escalate, he could never admit that his scheme was not evolving as he had originally hoped and planned. For that would mean that he had failed his country, failed his Emperor and, most important of all, failed himself.
